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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ELIAS A. SMITH and FRANCIS B. \ N O . 
CRITCHLOW, Trustees, a n d ( 4 3 7 2 
MONTANA-BINGHAM CON- l 
SOLIDATED MINING C 0 M-
PANY, a Corporation, 
Appellants. 
Respondent's Reply to Appellants' Petition 
for Rehearing 
Upon the oral argument as well as in its printed 
brief plaintiff took the position that the copper solution 
was plaintiff's property while in the dump and so con-
tinued until plaintiff had abandoned it, that the in-
stitution of this suit by plaintiff was for the purpose of 
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preserving this solution and preventing its running to 
waste, or, which is the same thing, passing into the 
hands of strangers. I t was plaintiff's position that this 
court's determination of title to the solutions while in 
the dump would conclude the controversy. Defendants' 
contention was, that whether or not title to the solutions 
while in the dump was in plaintiff was of no conse-
quence because the moment the solutions reached the 
surface beneath the dump—and there they must of 
necessity ultimately arrive—title would vest in the de-
fendants no matter where it had been prior to that time. 
Defendants, however, directed a substantial par t of 
their argument to the easement or grant to the plain-
tiff, choosing to treat the plaintiff as to these meteoric 
waters and solutions somewhat a trespasser, from which 
status the plaintiff could acquire no interest or title to 
the meteoric waters accumulated within the dump. 
They argued that the grant to plaintiff was so limited 
in its scope that while plaintiff must permit the rain 
and snow to fall upon the dump, seep into and percolate 
through it, yet plaintiff had acquired no right to take, 
remove or appropriate the valuable solutions after they 
had reached the surface beneath. Nature 's action 
being, as they contended, beyond the grant, not only 
these worthless meteoric waters belonged to the defend-
ants but the valuable mineral content, admittedly the 
property of plaintiff, picked up by those waters as 
they passed through the dump, became defendants' 
property upon its reaching the surface beneath, a sit-
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nation that plaintiff was powerless to avoid because of 
a claimed natural right in the defendants as owners of 
the fee to have these meteoric waters come to their 
surface. I t is not our intention now to re-argue this 
case and we of necessity conclude from a number of 
expressions in the opinion of this court that it has 
finally disposed of that issue, is clearly of the opinion 
and has decided that ' i the waters containing copper or 
other minerals in solution so long as they are in the 
dump and thus a par t of it * * * are like the 
dump itself, the property of the plaintiff.'' But to that 
portion of the petition and argument that is a criticism 
of the opinion as uncertain in expression, ambiguous 
and calculated to provoke disputes as to the meaning 
thereof and the purport intended, we direct this reply. 
For ready reference we set out the portion of the 
opinion with which we are here concerned, as follows: 
" * * * The plaintiff thus commenced 
this action to condemn a right of way and ease-
ments over the defendant's claims, the surface of 
which had not theretofore been conveyed to the 
plaintiff, to excavate a tunnel and lay a pipe line 
on the surface of the defendant's claim or claims 
to collect and divert the waters in the dump so 
carrying copper and other minerals in solution 
and to convey them to tanks of its own where 
the copper and other minerals may be precipitated 
and saved for its own use and benefit. 
" I t is not contended that the plaintiff, under 
the statute, was not entitled to exercise the right 
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of eminent domain, provided the waters carrying 
copper in solution and by the plaintiff sought to 
be collected and diverted belonged to it. * * * 
Confessedly, the determination of the case de-
pends largely upon the question of whether the 
waters carrying copper in solution, so long as 
they are still in the dump, are the property of the 
plaintiff or of the defendant. It may be conceded 
that the waters, though they carry copper in so-
lution picked up from the dump as they seep 
through it, after they were suffered and permitted 
to flow out of the dump and seep and percolate 
through soil and earth on the claim or claims of 
the defendant, not conveyed to the plaintiff became 
a part of such soil and earth and the property of 
the defendant, and thus lost to the plaintiff. But 
how does the matter stand so long as the waters 
seeping and percolating through the dump are 
still in the dump and a par t of it? * * * I t is 
conceded that the dump or deposit itself is per-
sonal property and is the property of the plain-
tiff with the right at any time to remove it or 
any part thereof. That the dump contains cop-
per of commercial value is not disputed. The 
gulch in which the dump is deposited is on the 
side of a mountain and is of funnel shape with 
the toe at the bottom or lower end of the dump 
and gulch. As described, it represents a some-
what inclined hopper in which material was de-
posited first on the lower and narrow part of 
it and then on higher levels along the upper por-
tion of it. As the rain and snow fell on the dump 
the waters, as they seeped through it, picked up 
copper and other minerals in solution * * # 
What the plaintiff proposes to do is to construct 
a tunnel through the fill and on the surface of 
the defendant's claim * * * and extend two 
open trenches about five or six feet long at right 
angles to the face of its tunnel, and by such 
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means gather and collect the waters in and at the 
bottom of the dump and convey them by a pipe 
line to its precipitating tanks below. * * * I t 
is not contemplated by the plaintiff to take 
waters not in the dump, and, as made to appear, 
the proposed plan will not collect or take any 
other waters. I t also is made to appear without 
any substantial conflict that before the material 
was deposited in the dump all waters flowing from 
the gulch were waters from freshets or high 
waters and that at greater portions of the year 
there was no water flowing from the gulch, and 
what waters did flow from it contained no min-
erals and partially were used by others for cul-
inary and domestic purposes. And it also is made 
to appear that the waters which, at the time of 
the commencement of this action, were collected 
and conveyed by the defendant, were waters com-
ing directly from the dump carrying copper in 
solution picked up as the waters seeped and passed 
through the dump. 
"Thus , under the circumstances, we are of 
the opinion that the waters carrying copper or 
other minerals in solution, so long as they are in 
the dump and thus a part of it, and before they 
leave it and percolate through the soil and earth 
on the claim or claims of the defendant not con-
veyed to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, 
the property of the plaintiff; that it is as lawful 
for the plaintiff, so long as the waters are in the 
dump, to collect and remove them as it is to re-
move the dump itself; and that the grant which 
gave the plaintiff the right at any time to remove 
the dump or any part thereof also gave it the 
right to remove the waters carrying copper or 
other minerals of commercial value in solution. 
" * * * the defendant makes no claim to 
any of the ore or other material deposited on the 
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dump; and since the copper in solution is from 
the dump and from the ore and material deposited 
thereon and therein and not otherwise, it would 
seem that the defendant has no better claim to 
the mineral in solution, so long as it is in the 
dump, than to the ore or other material in the 
dump. 
"
 #
 * * the rain and snow falling on the 
dump did not fall on the surface of the defend-
ant 's ground. The surface of that ground and 
upon which the dump rests was conveyed to the 
plaintiff. True, it was conveyed for dumping 
purposes, but so long as the surface is occupied 
by the dump, it, as surface ground, is not suscep-
tible of any other use; and waters falling on and 
flowing or seeping through the dump, so long as 
they are in the dump, do not fall on or seep or 
percolate through soil of the defendant or on or 
through any surface right owned by it but on a 
surface right and material, ore, rock, and earth 
owned by the plaintiff. * * * 
" * * *
 n o waters percolating through 
the soil of the defendant are here involved and 
are not sought or attempted to be taken b}^ the 
plaintiff. What it proposes to do is to collect 
and take the waters carrying copper in solution 
while yet in the dump and before they reach the 
soil or ground of the defendant. Were the plain-
tiff attempting to follow, collect, and divert wat-
ers, though they carry copper in solution, after 
they have left the dump and percolating in and 
through the soil and ground of the defendant not 
conveyed to the plaintiff, the cited cases would be 
applicable, but that is not what the plaintiff seeks 
to do. I t may readily be conceded that waters, 
though they carry copper or other minerals in 
solution, which are suffered and permitted to 
flow and escape from the dump and seep and per-
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colate through the soil and earth of the defend-
ant 's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff and on 
or in which it has no surface or other rights, are 
lost to the plaintiff and become the propery of 
the defendant and may not be pursued or re-
claimed or taken by the plaintiff. 
" * * * do the waters carrying copper 
in solution, as long as they are and remain in the 
dump and before they leave it and percolate 
through the soil and ground of the defendant not 
conveyed to the plaintiff, belong to the plaintiff 
or to the defendant? We have no hesitancy in 
answering that question in favor of the plaintiff. 
" * * * counsel for defendant * * * 
offered to prove that the gulch, where it connected 
with the main canyon was narrow and steep, but 
as it extended up the side of the mountain it wid-
ened out and was less steep; that from the 
excavations made since the order of immediate 
possession it appeared that the soil on the side 
and the bottom of the gulch on the defendant's 
property and under the dump was from eight to 
thirty feet deep; that the waters resulting from 
rain and snow then and in the past percolated 
through such soil as they reached the bottom of 
the gulch; that such soil prior to the deposits 
retarded the waters falling from the rain and 
snow and that the dump further retarded them 
as they fell on and seeped through the dump; that 
in the defendant's mining operations a tunnel, 
excavated on and in its claim or claims, inter-
cepted and gathered the waters below the actual 
surface soil which waters had been intercepted 
and diverted by a pipe line of the defendant,' and 
that such tunnel waters are a part of the waters 
used by the defendant in precipitating therefrom 
the copper content taken into solution from the 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
surface dump and in copper rock in place; and 
that 'The effect of the proposed tunnel and divert-
ing works and pipe line of the plaintiff, if the 
same were constructed, will be to necessarily 
divert and impound and take away from the de-
fendant the tunnel waters aforesaid.' 
a # # # 
" *
 #
 * We are of the opinion that por-
tions of the offered testimony were material, 
especially that part of the offer where it was 
offered to prove that among the waters collected 
and diverted by the defendant by means of its 
tunnel were waters seeping and percolating 
through the soil and collecting copper in solution 
from rock in place on the defendant's claims and 
that the proposed tunnel, diverting works, and 
pipe line of the plaintiff would divert, impound, 
and take such waters from the defendant's tun-
nel. However, since the judgment does not give 
the plaintiff any such waters, we think the ruling 
harmless. We have already indicated that the 
plaintiff is entitled to collect, divert, and take the 
waters carrying copper and other minerals in 
solution as long as such waters are in and a par t 
of the dump, but that the plaintiff is not entitled 
to pursue and reclaim or take such or any waters 
after they have left the dump and seep and perco-
late through the soil or earth on the defendant's 
claim or claims not conveyed to the plaintiff. Of 
course, as is seen, the plaintiff, by its proposed 
plan of collecting and diverting the waters in the 
dump, to a large extent at least, will deprive the 
defendant of such waters; but the plaintiff has 
the undoubted right to do that. I t is not re-
quired to suffer or permit such waters in the 
dump ladened with copper or other minerals in 
solution to flow out and seep and percolate in and 
through the soil of the defendant's claim or 
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claims not conveyed to the plaintiff for the defend-
ant 's use and benefit. The defendant has an in-
terest in and to such waters only after they are 
suffered and permitted to flow and leave the dump 
and percolate through the soil and earth and be-
come a part of its ground not conveyed to the 
plaintiff. If the plaintiff in collecting and divert-
ing waters shall take waters which are not in the 
dump or a par t of it, but are seeping and percolat-
ing through the earth and soil of the defendant's 
ground not conveyed to the plaintiff, the defend-
ant is not without remedy and by this action is not 
precluded from asserting its right to such waters. 
''The findings and the judgment of the court 
are in harmony with these views, except in one 
of the conclusions stated by the court wherein the 
court stated a conclusion that ' although such 
water and solutions in said dump or deposit should 
percolate through the natural surface soil beneath 
said dump and upon the mining claims of the 
defendants before plaintiff should have collected, 
conserved, or diverted the same, plaintiff would 
not be thereby divested of said title, but on the 
contrary plaintiff would continue throughout such 
percolation until, upon and subsequent to plain-
tiff's collection and diversion of said waters and 
solutions, the absolute owner thereof, with the 
untrammeled right in plaintiff to dispose of said 
waters and solutions as plaintiff's advantage 
might dictate.' Such a statement would imply 
that the plaintiff has the right to follow the 
waters after they leave the dump and seep and 
percolate through the soil and earth on the defend-
ants ' ground or claims not conveyed to the plain-
tiff. But not anything of that kind is contained 
in the findings or in the judgment. The findings 
and the judgment give the plaintiff the right to 
take the waters carrying copper or other min-
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erals in solution only so long as they are in the 
dump and a part of it and give the plaintiff no 
right to pursue waters seeping and percolating 
through the soil and earth on the defendant's 
ground not conveyed to the plaintiff. We there-
fore think that the ruling refusing the defend-
ant 's offer was harmless. However, since con-
clusions may to some extent be considered as am-
plifying or reflecting findings and a judgment, 
that portion of the conclusions just referred to 
is disapproved and ordered stricken and the 
district court directed to recast its conclusions in 
such respect, and if there be any such or similar 
provisions either in the findings or in the judg-
ment which have escaped our attention, to like-
wise in such respect recast those. In all other 
particulars the findings are approved and the 
judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent." 
(Italics ours). 
It is said in that opinion that " the surface of that 
ground and upon which the dump rests was conveyed 
to the plaintiff." And in the course of the opinion 
this court defines the balance of defendants' property 
as that "not conveyed to the plaintiff". This definition 
so phrased occurs no less than eleven times in this 
opinion and cannot be said to have been an inadvert-
ence. This opinion cannot be reasonably construed 
otherwise than as holding that the grant by the 
defendants' predecessors to plaintiff was a conveyance of 
the surface upon which the dump rests for the purposes 
stated in the grant "and that the grant which gave to 
plaintiff the right at any time to remove the dump or any 
part thereof also gave it the right to remove the 
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waters carrying copper or other minerals of commercial 
value in solution". Whether this grant be denominated 
a conveyance of the fee in the surface or an easement 
for these purposes is of very little importance. If an 
easement merely, that easement is imposed upon the 
fee, and the purport of the decision is that plaintiff by 
that grant acquired the right at any time to remove 
the mineral solutions from the dump by any reasonable 
or practical method, using therein the fee upon which 
this easement was imposed for that purpose. There is 
only one method possible whereby these solutions may 
be removed, and that is the method plaintiff has adopt-
ed. It is perfectly obvious that the solutions cannot 
be removed from the dump before they reach the sur-
face beneath, but the right to use that surface "upon 
which the dump r e s t s " as a collecting medium and 
conduit this court has clearly held within the terms of 
the grant or easement. It is difficult to express that 
thought more clearly than this court has itself done. 
Jus t note the following: 
" I t is not contemplated by the plaintiff to 
take waters not in the dump, and, as made to 
appear, the proposed plan will not collect or take 
any other waters. * # * And it also is made 
to appear that the waters which, at the time of 
the commencement of this action, were collected 
and conveyed by the defendant, were waters com-
ing directly from the dump carrying copper in 
solution picked up as the waters seeped and 
passed through the dump. 
"Thus , under the circumstances, we are of 
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the opinion that the waters carrying copper or 
other minerals in solution, so long as they are 
in the dump and thus a par t of it, and before 
they leave it and percolate through the soil and 
earth on the claim or claims of the defendant not 
conveyed to the plaintiff, are, like the dump it-
self, the property of the plaintiff; that it is as 
lawful for the plaintiff, so long as the waters are 
in the dump, to collect and remove them as it is 
to remove the dump itself; and that the grant 
which gave the plaintiff the right at any time to 
remove the dump or any part thereof also gave it 
the right to remove the waters carrying copper 
or other minerals of commercial value in solution. 
$k $k $k $k dfc * ; A'; ;W; 
" * *
 #
 I t may readily be conceded that 
waters, though they carry copper or other min-
erals in solution, which are! suffered and permitted 
to flow and escape from the dump and seep and 
percolate through the soil and earth of the de-
fendant's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff and 
on or in which it has no surface or other rights, 
are lost to the plaintiff and become the property 
of the defendant and may not be pursued or re-
claimed or taken by the plaintiff. 
" * * * do the waters carrying copper 
in solution, as long as they are and remain in 
the dump and before they leave it and percolate 
through the soil and ground of the defendant not 
conveyed to the plaintiff, belong to the plaintiff 
or to the defendant! We have no hesitancy in 
answering that question in favor of the plaintiff. 
" * * * Of course, as is seen, the plain-
tiff, by its proposed plan of collecting and divert-
ing the waters in the dump, to a large extent at 
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least, will deprive the defendant of such waters; 
but the plaintiff has the undoubted right to do 
that. I t is not required to suffer or permit such 
waters in the dump ladened with copper or other 
minerals in solution to flow out and seep and per-
colate in and through the soil of the defendant's 
claim or claims not conveyed to the plaintiff for 
the defendant's use and benefit. The defendant 
has an interest in and to such waters only after 
they are suffered and permitted to flow and leave 
the dump and percolate through the soil and earth 
and become a part of its ground not conveyed to 
the plaintiff. * * * " (Italics ours). 
It is said in the petition for rehearing that " the 
court 's opinion assumes that the dump is at bed rock", 
which is contrary to the fact because there is soil upon 
bed rock. What difference can it make that there be soil 
on bed rock beneath the dump? If there were no soil, 
counsel would continue consistent with their theory 
that the moment the mineral solutions of the plaintiff 
touch bed rock, by some magic plaintiff would be forth-
with divested of its title to the solutions and they 
would thereupon become the property of defendants. 
The solutions must be collected somewhere before 
plaintiff can take them, just as the dump when de-
posited must have found some place upon this surface 
upon which to repose. Both rights are includued with-
in the grant or easement, as this court so clearly stated 
in its opinion. To say that this court has found title 
in plaintiff to the solutions while in the dump up to 
but not after they have reached the surface upon which 
the dump rests and that title passes immediately to de-
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fendant when those solutions shall have reached such 
surface, thereby depriving plaintiff of any way of gain-
ing possession of property pursuant to the provisions 
of that grant of which plaintiff is the decreed owner, 
while at the same time affirming a judgment in con-
demnation for the purpose of collecting, diverting and 
appropriating that property, is to put an absurd con-
struction upon the opinion of this court and is a state-
ment that indicates defendants' refusal to read the 
opinion fairly—none so blind as they who will not see. 
Defendants indeed take the Shylock incident seriously. 
We have never held a very high regard for it as legal 
authority, although we think there have been some 
thousands of other occasions when it has been cited by 
lawyers suffering from a dearth of legal precedent. Of 
course the plaintiff wants nothing but the solutions in 
its dump, which this court has decided are its. property 
and which plaintiff has the right to remove and keep 
as its own, and, of course, the defendants want nothing 
but the very same solutions, which this court has decid-
ed they do not own and of which they have no right to 
deprive the plaintiff. 
The petition for rehearing in so far as it is an 
attempt to re-argue this case is met squarely by the 
decision of this court. The opinion of this court is 
plain and it is not subject to hair-splitting criticism. I t 
gives to plaintiff the untrammeled right to remove the 
copper-laden waters contained in plaintiff's dump by 
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any practical method or means and holds by the method 
plaintiff proposes, plaintiff has not encroached upon 
the property rights of defendants beyond the scope of 
this eminent domain proceeding; that should further 
encroachment ever become necessary plaintiff may 
resort to the eminent domain statutes whereby to se-
cure such rights, just as it has done in the instant case. 
We can find nothing in this petition to justify a 
reargument of the case. There is nothing ambiguous 
in this opinion and the petition for rehearing should 
be denied. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, PARSONS & ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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